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Abstract 
Difficulties in recognizing emotional signals might have serious implications for social interac-
tions. Neurodegenerative diseases that affect neural networks involved in emotional displays 
processing might thus be connected with a disproportionate impairment in social life. This study 
aimed at examining the ability to decode basic emotions from dynamic visual displays in mild to 
moderate dementia. Thirty old adults diagnosed as demented, and 30 gender-matched healthy 
controls were administered a measure of emotion evaluation. The groups did not differ signifi-
cantly in age and educational level. The emotion evaluation test was designed to examine a per-
son’s ability to visually identify basic emotions and discriminate these from neutral expressions, 
when they were expressed as dynamic, subtle, day-to-day expressions. Results showed that de-
mented participants had a great difficulty in recognizing the positively valenced emotions of hap-
piness and pleasant surprise, while sadness, anger, and anxiety were the easiest emotions to rec-
ognize. Healthy controls were almost excellent on happiness recognition, while discrimination of 
non-emotional displays was the most difficult condition often mislabeled as anxiety or pleasant 
surprise. Results were mainly discussed in terms of socio-emotional selectivity theory positing 
that only older adults capable of exerting cognitive controlled favor emotional over non-emotional 
and positive over negative information. 
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1. Introduction 
Emotional signals are considered as main aspects of social communication and social functioning in general; 
face especially provides perceivers with a wealth of socially relevant information about another person’s identity, 
age, sex, emotion and direction of attention. The ability to accurately recognize facial emotional expressions of 
basic emotions, for example happiness, surprise, fear etc., is a fundamental prerequisite for successful interac-
tion in everyday social life. The recognition and detection of emotions from bodily expressions and different 
categories of postures are considered as equally important, as individuals use them to make inferences about the 
emotional states of others via extracting contextual information useful for an emotional interpretation. Besides, 
emotional postures also increase the perceived intensity of emotions and the realism of animations [1] [2]. Being 
able to infer what others are feeling enables us to anticipate events, avoid conflicts and regulate our emotions. 
Accordingly, deficits in emotion recognition can have a devastating impact on social skills, on several forms of 
verbal and non-verbal communication and the development and maintenance of key social relationships [3]-[6]. 
In corroboration of this consideration, recent research findings indicate that interpersonal difficulties and 
poorer quality of life in old age are associated with emotion perception difficulties. In detail, there is evidence 
that normal aging affects emotion recognition abilities and demonstrates substantial decline in categorization of 
facial expressions. Scholars in the field suggest that these declines are associated with, or stem from cognitive 
deficits that emerge as people grow older, from biological changes in the perceptual systems involved in detect-
ing key facial features that communicate emotions, or from motivational shifts across the lifespan, that impact 
how emotional information is processed. In fact, the extant literature has confirmed that age-related deficits in 
fluid intelligence, speed of processing, executive functions, and working memory are related to older adults’ 
lower performance in facial emotion recognition tasks, compared with younger ones [5] [7]. Furthermore, nor-
mal aging is considered to have an impact on frontal lobe function, which is crucial for recognizing certain neg-
ative emotions, such as anger [8] [9]. 
Parallel to classical cognitive deficits, several deficits can occur in specific cases, such as in early stages of 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) or even in Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) [3] [10]. Patients with AD have been 
shown to perform significantly worse than age-matched control participants in recognizing sad, angry, fearful, 
surprised, happy, and disgusted faces. However, performance can vary across the type and the modality of emo-
tion. Moreover, Guaita et al. [11] point out that there are different and conflicting findings as regards the role of 
cognitive deficit and the stage of dementia in emotion recognition abilities see also [12]-[14]. 
Apart from these general considerations, further questions have been arisen concerning the specific categories 
of emotions that have been found to be difficult for detecting and recognizing. Indeed, as regards cognitively 
healthy older adults, compared with young adults, there is a body of literature that supports the existence of dif-
ficulties in recognizing negative emotions [8] [15] and a general preference in processing positively valenced 
information and recognizing more positive than negative emotions [8] [12] [16]-[21] even in older adults with 
amnestic MCI [13]. In fact, recent research [13] [20] [21] states the emotion of happiness as the most identified 
emotion among other basic emotions. Henri et al. [22] support that, on the other hand, recognition of disgust is 
well-preserved even in dementia cases. In general, several explanations and approaches are offered through the 
existed literature concerning this distinction between the capabilities to recognize positive emotions and nega-
tive emotions. 
On the one hand, there are mainly some neuropsychological aspects supporting that older adults’ worsening 
negative emotion recognition performance may stem from the decline of brain regions important for processing 
negative affect [23] [24]. Moreover, at this point it must be mentioned that recent research indicates that uncer-
tainty is also a critical emotional stimulus’ dimension for engaging the same brain regions (i.e., orbitofrontal 
cortex) that are involved in decoding—mainly but not exclusively—of negatively valenced emotional dis-
plays and that decline with age [25]-[27]. 
On the other hand, there is an empirically strong motivational explanation which is supported by the So-
cio-emotional Selectivity Theory (SST) [28] [29] according to which older adults are generally biased towards 
positive information processing. A large literature supports that young adults focus on emotionally negative 
events more than on positive ones. It has been claimed that this tendency which is designated as the “negativity 
bias” is over-determined and is likely adaptive [20] [30] [31]. However, on the basis of resent research, the ne-
gativity bias appears to shift with advancing age. More specifically, the respective research shows that there is a 
relatively higher proportion of emotional information and especially of positively valenced information com-
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pared to neutral or negatively valenced one that is remembered, recalled and recognized by older adults [20] 
[32]-[34]. According to the SST, this shift is due to future time perspective. When people draw near the end of 
their life, becoming increasingly aware of limited remaining time, and this kind of awareness leads them to pri-
oritize emotional goals that could enhance and optimize their current experience [20] [30] [31], see also [35]. In 
this vein, they present a “bias” in information processing that leads them to favor emotional over non-emotional 
information—especially in circumstances that do not provide enough opportunities for strategic processing [32] 
[33], and positive over negative information [36] [37]. 
The last “bias” mentioned has been termed the “positivity effect” attributed to strategic processes, in sharp 
contrast with the assumption that the negativity bias in young adults occurs at an automatic processing level [20] 
[37]. Specifically, according to Kryla-Lighthall and Mather [37], there are two lines of evidence that support the 
assumption that older adults use cognitive control to achieve affect optimization: 1) older adults with a higher 
level of cognitive abilities and executive functions are more effective in emotion regulation, compared with old-
er adults with limited cognitive resources; 2) the emergence of the “positivity effect” depends on constrains in 
cognition. When circumstances do not allow for goal-directed processing (i.e., splitting attention between mul-
tiple tasks), the “positivity effect” appears to be reversed to an “automatic negativity bias” in older adults’ cog-
nition [17] [37] [38]. According to Kryla-Lighthall and Mather [37], this is not surprising given that controlling 
affect needs increase neural activation in executive function regions including the prefrontal cortex. Considering 
that these regions deteriorate significantly with advancing age, older adults need to compensate for these deficits 
by recruiting more cognitive resources in their efforts to regulate affect, compared with young adults. There-
fore, older adults are successful in affect regulation including the mechanism of the “positivity effect”, only 
when they can devote considerable amount of cognitive control to regulation [37] [39] [40]. 
Furthermore, as regards the neurological functioning requirements for regulating emotions through controlled 
processing, there is evidence that older adults experience significant age-related losses to cognitive control 
structures such as the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex. These brain regions are considered 
“top-down” affect processing regions, as they are involved in higher-order cognitive processing allowing for 
flexible responses necessary for controlling affect [37] [39] [40]. However, there is also evidence that even if 
older adults experience age-related losses to cognitive control structures, healthy older adults can achieve affect 
optimization by recruiting additional resources to implement their regulation goals and this is clearly supported 
by the evidence regarding age differences in neural activation during emotion processing see for a review [37]. 
At this point in must be also mentioned that the primary structure that is responsible for appraising the affective 
quality of information rapidly and automatically (“bottom-up” processing), that is, the amygdala, remains stable 
with advancing age while is damaged even in the early stages of some types of dementias such as the AD [14] 
[39] [40]. 
The Current Study 
In this theoretical vein, the aim of the present study was to identify the pattern of differences in basic emotion 
decoding from dynamic visual cues in cognitively healthy and demented older adults. Given that the emergence 
of the “positivity effect” became non-possible and might be reversed to an automatic “negativity bias” in older 
adults with limited cognitive resources, we expected demented older adults would not perform as well as cogni-
tively healthy ones in decoding positively valenced emotional displays and especially positive displays that were 
not characterized by uncertainty (Hypothesis 1). We also expected demented older adults to have higher perfor-
mance in decoding negatively valenced emotional displays, compared to healthy older adults (Hypothesis 2). 
Moreover, given that affect optimization was also associated with favoring emotional over non-emotional in-
formation processing, a third hypothesis was formulated. According to Hypothesis 3, cognitively healthy older 
adults would not perform as well as demented ones on recognizing emotionally neutral displays, due to the ten-
dency to detect emotion in non-emotional displays. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants and Procedure 
As regards the sample of the study, there were 30 participants diagnosed as demented (11 men, 19 women) and 
30 gender-matched healthy controls. All participants were aged 67 and over. The participants of the demented 
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group were staying within the places of hospitality mentioned below. The two groups did not differ significantly 
in age, t (58) = 1.57, p > 0.05. Demented group: M = 78 years, SD: 4.86, Age-range: 68 - 86 years; Healthy con-
trols: M = 76.03 years, SD: 4.84, Age-range: 67 - 85 years. They also did not differ significantly in educational 
level (EL), t (58) = −0.39, p > 0.05. EL was defined according to the number of years of education. Demented 
group: EL 1 (0 - 6 years) and n = 15, EL 2 (7 - 12 years) and n = 14, EL 3 (≥13 years) and n = 1; Healthy con-
trols: EL 1 (0 - 6 years) and n = 16, EL 2 (7 - 12 years) and n = 10, EL 3 (≥13 years) and n = 4. 
The demented group was recruited from two places of hospitality for elderly people. The first place was a 
boarding house of the parish church of St. Paraskevi in Athens. The second place was a center of elderly 
people’s hospitality in Halkis (Euboea). The demented participants were diagnosed by consultant neurologists 
and psychiatrists and met diagnostic criteria for possible dementia as established by both neurological assess-
ment using Magnetic Resonance Imaging and cognitive assessment via the Mini Mental State Examination 
(MMSE) tool. They had MMSE scores between 13 and 20, falling in the mild to moderately demented range. 
The healthy control participants were community dwelling adults—volunteers recruited by the researchers 
through seniors’ centers. Potential participants in the healthy control group were excluded if they had MMSE 
scores of less than 27. 
Exclusion criteria for all groups were history of neurological conditions or psychiatric diseases, alcohol or 
drug abuse, severe head trauma, profound visual impairments, verbal incomprehension and a Geriatric Depres-
sion Scale (GDS)—15 score of over than 6. 
Participants were examined at an individual basis either at the center recruited or in their own home. For all 
control and demented participants informed consent was obtained and then they completed an individu-
al—demographics form. All the participants additionally completed the Greek version of the Mini Mental State 
Examination MMSE [41] [42]. The MMSE was used to provide an estimate of overall cognitive functioning. 
They also completed the Greek version of the Geriatric Depression Scale—15 (GDS-15 [43] [44]) to assess cur-
rent depression symptoms. This was followed by an assessment of emotion recognition as measured by the 
Emotion Evaluation Task of the TASIT [15] [45]-[47]. 
2.2. Instrument: The Emotion Evaluation Task (EET-FORMA) [15] [45]-[47] 
To examine the ability to decode basic emotions from ecologically valid cues, the “TASIT PART I: Emotion 
Evaluation Task (EET-FORM A)” was used. The EET is the first part of a broader audiovisual tool designed for 
the clinical assessment of social perception that is called “The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT)”. 
The EET was designed to examine a person’s ability to identify six basic emotions, namely happiness, pleasant 
surprise, sadness, anger, anxiety, and disgust, and discriminate these from neutral expressions, when they are 
portrayed dynamically by professional actors. Specifically, it comprises 28 alternative forms of a series of short 
(15 - 60 seconds) videotaped vignettes of people interacting in everyday situations. In fact, “people” are actors 
trained in the “Method” style that requires the actor to elicit a real emotion in himself/herself. At this point it 
must be mentioned that actors were specifically trained not to provide the viewer with unlimited exposure to an 
emotional expression, because, in real life, displays of genuine emotion are fleeting and evolving and usually 
mediated by a tendency to “play against” expressions of strong emotion. Besides actor’s style, the EET uses 
visual and auditory contextual cues to assess emotion decoding systematically. 
In some scenes there is only one actor talking. Other scenes depict two actors. In these cases instructions are 
given to focus on one of them. The “target” actor in each scene enacts the script according to one of the six basic 
emotions or no particular emotion (the “neutral” condition). After viewing each scene the participant is asked to 
choose the emotion displayed by the actor from a list of six emotional categories and one non-emotional cate-
gory (neutral) displayed in random order on one of five Response Cards. 
The 28 scenes comprise four portrayals of each emotion including the “neutral” condition, in quasi-rando- 
mized order. At this point it must be mentioned that all scripts are neutral in content and do not lend themselves 
to any specific emotion. However, considering that the test was developed in English, for the purposes of the 
present study, we decided to administer it with the sound turned off, so as to focus on the person’s ability to read 
dynamic visual cues. Administration of EET typically took between 15 - 25 min, depending on the participant’s 
age. The EET was administered according to the standard procedure outlined in the relevant manual. A practice 
item preceded the main task to familiarize the participant with the task requirements. 
As regards the psychometric qualities of the EET, based on the performance of adults with severe traumatic 
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brain injury, a reliability estimate for test-retest was found in the moderate level (r = 0.74). In relation to EET’s 
construct validity, it was found that it was significantly correlated with premorbid IQ, information processing 
speed, new learning of socially relevant information and specifically faces, executive function as measured by a 
socially relevant task and a geometric problem solving task measuring visuospatial and analogical reasoning, 
and the Ekman photo labeling and matching tasks as measures of social perception [15] [45]-[47]. 
3. Results 
EET data were firstly analyzed with a 2 × 7 mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects variable of group status 
(demented-healthy older adults) and the within-subjects variable of emotion type (happy, surprised, angry, an-
xious, sad, revolted, and neutral). These analyses indicated that there was a main effect of group status, F (1, 58) 
= 7.69, p = 0.007, 2pη  = 0.12, and of emotion type, F (6, 348) = 11.71, p < 0.001, 
2
pη  = 0.17. There also was a 
large interaction effect, F (6, 348) = 26.26, p < 0.001, 2pη  = 0.31. 
To analyze the interaction between group and emotion type observed for EET, tests of simple effects were 
conducted. For four of the emotions and the neutral condition, group was a significant simple main effect in the 
alpha level of 0.001: Happiness, F (1, 58) = 90.85, p < 0.001; Anger, F (1, 58) = 18.72, p < 0.001; Anxiety, F (1, 
58) = 23.42, p < 0.001; Sadness, F (1, 58) = 28.48, p < 0.001; Neutral condition, F (1, 58) = 11.46, p = 0.001. 
Relative to healthy controls, the demented group had a significantly lower ability of correct recognition of hap-
piness but a significantly higher ability to recognize the three negatively valenced emotions of anger, anxiety 
and sadness as well as to discriminate the non-emotional or neutral visual displays. In addition, the findings 
showed that there was a tendency for better recognition of disgust in the demented group compared to healthy 
controls: Disgust, F (1, 58) = 5.66, p = 0.02. The exception was pleasant surprise, where group was clearly not a 
significant simple main effect, F (1, 58) = 0.91, p = 0.345. 
Further tests of simple effects revealed that emotion type was a significant simple main effect within each 
group: Demented participants, F (6, 174) = 25.77, p < 0.001, 2pη  = 0.47; Healthy elderly subsample, F (6, 174) 
= 13.35, p < 0.001, 2pη  = 0.32. In terms of the pattern of these simple effects (see Figure 1), demented partici-
pants had a great difficulty recognizing happiness, M = 1.30, SD = 1.05. The other one positively valenced emo-
tion, that is pleasant surprise, was the second most difficult emotion to recognize, M = 1.70, SD = 1.26. On the 
other hand, sadness, M = 3.63, SD = 0.76, anger, M = 3.17, SD = 0.70, and anxiety, M = 3.07, SD = 0.87, were 
the first, second, and third easiest emotions to recognize, respectively, with disgust, M = 2.93, SD = 0.91, and 
the neutral condition, M = 2.30, SD = 1.02, to follow them. 
Inversely, healthy controls were almost excellent in happiness recognition, M = 3.53, SD = 0.73, while dis-
crimination of non-emotional displays (neutral condition) was by far the most difficult condition for them, M = 
1.33, SD = 1.18. Sadness, M = 2.33, SD = 1.09, disgust, M = 2.23, SD = 1.33, anger, M = 2.10, SD = 1.16, plea-
sant surprise, M = 2.00, SD = 1.17, and anxiety, M = 1.90, SD = 0.99, in descending order of recognition, fell 
between them (see Figure 2). 
On the basis of the aforementioned findings, it was considered useful to assess whether any of the group dif-
ferences in the worst recognized emotion by the demented group, that is happiness, and the worst recognized  
 
 
Figure 1. Decoding of basic emotions from dynamic visual cues in dementia. 
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Figure 2. Decoding of basic emotions from dynamic visual cues in cognitively healthy aging. 
 
condition by the cognitively healthy group, that is non-emotional displays, reflected differences in patterns of 
error responses. Inspection of the percentage of error types in relation to the four EET scenes with portrayals of 
happiness indicated that the most commonly made error in the demented group was to label happiness displays 
as pleasant surprise ones (see Table 1). Inspection of the percentage of error types in relation to the scenes in-
cluding emotionally neutral portrayals indicated that a systematic error in the demented group was to label emo-
tionally neutral displays as displays of sadness, whilst the cognitively healthy group is presented with a more 
heterogeneous pattern of error responding. In fact, healthy older adults most often mislabeled neutrality as an-
xiety or pleasant surprise (see Table 1). 
Subsequently, Pearson correlations were computed to examine whether total error responses as regards hap-
piness and non-emotional displays recognition, were correlated with correct decoding of each of the six target 
emotions and the neutral condition. Whilst significant associations were observed in the demented group be-
tween recognition of happiness and error responses (1 = correct response; 2 = wrong response) for each one of 
the four scenes with portrayals of happiness, r = −0.79, p < 0.001, r = −0.56, p = 0.001, r = −0.56, p = 0.001, r = 
−0.55, p = 0.002, respectively, the fact that the correlations were negative simply indicates that error responses 
were associated with fewer correct identifications of happiness. Taking into account the findings presented in 
Table 1 for the demented group, the significant correlation found between recognition of pleasant surprise and 
error responses for the third scene with happiness portrayals, r = −0.61, p < 0.001, indicates that misuse of the 
label “surprised” was associated with fewer correct identifications of surprise overall. In other words, a probably 
preferential use of the ‘surprised’ label was not associated with correct identification of surprise in the demented 
group. Finally, the only positive correlation found was between recognition of anger and error responses for the 
first scene with happiness portrayals in the demented group, r = 0.47, p = 0.008. This finding may be indicative 
of an overall prevalence of negativity bias in cognitively unhealthy elderly that makes it difficult to identify 
happiness. 
4. Discussion 
The present study aimed at identifying the pattern of differences in basic emotions’ decoding from dynamic vis-
ual cues in cognitively healthy and demented older adults. The first hypothesis formulated was that demented 
older adults would not recognize positively valenced emotional displays as well as cognitively healthy ones 
(Hypothesis 1). Inversely, it was hypothesized that they would perform higher than cognitively healthy older 
adults in the recognition of negatively valenced emotional cues (Hypothesis 2). Indeed, the results showed that 
patients with dementia were significantly impaired in happiness decoding from dynamic visual cues—syste- 
matically tending to confuse happiness with pleasant surprise—compared to cognitively healthy older adults. 
These, on the other hand, had an almost excellent performance on happiness recognition. Moreover, pleasant 
surprise, the second positively valenced emotion examined in this study, was also the second most difficult emo-
tion to recognize in the case of the demented group. Inversely, as expected, relatively to healthy controls, the 
demented group was found to have a significantly higher ability to recognize the four negatively valenced emotions  
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Table 1. Correct and erroneous identifications of dynamic happiness displays and non-emotional (neutral) cues in demented 
and cognitively healthy elderly. 
Target emotion Emotion label selected (percentage) 
Scenes 1 - 4 Happiness Positive surprise Neutral Sadness Anger Anxiety Disgust 
Happiness 1        
Demented 30% 46.7% 23.3%     
Healthy 73.3% 13.3%  3.3% 6.7% 3.3%  
Happiness 2        
Demented 16.7% 66.7% 16.7%     
Healthy 90% 10%      
Happiness 3        
Demented 16.7% 73.3% 6.7%     
Healthy 93.3% 6.7%      
Happiness 4        
Demented 66.7% 23.3% 10.0%     
Healthy 93.3% 6.7%      
Neutral 1        
Demented  10% 56.7% 23.3%  10%  
Healthy  16.7% 26.7% 16.7%  40%  
Neutral 2        
Demented   63.3% 30%  6.7%  
Healthy 10% 33.3% 36.7% 10% 3.3% 6.7%  
Neutral 3        
Demented  10% 46.7% 43.3%    
Healthy  10% 36.7% 16.7% 3.3% 23.3% 10% 
Neutral 4        
Demented   60% 26.7%  13.3%  
Healthy  26.7% 33.3% 13.3% 6.7% 20%  
 
examined in this study, and mainly anger, anxiety, and sadness. Hence, the current findings seem to confirm the 
theoretical account of older adults’ positivity bias, known as “the cognitive control model” [37] [48]. 
According to the broader line of reasoning of the Socio-emotional Selectivity Theory, older adults’ positivity 
effect is due to their greater focus on regulating emotions compared to young adults, in order to enhance their 
current experience, because they are aware of their limited remaining time in life [19] [28] [29] [34] [35]. The 
cognitive control model claims that this kind of demanding self-regulation relies on brain-resource-dependent 
cognitive control processes that take place in healthy aging [37] [48]. Specifically, recent research shows that 
healthy older adults, compared to young adults, show increased prefrontal cortex (PFC) or anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) activity together with decreased amygdala activity while processing negative stimuli. Hence, 
age-related decreases in amygdala activity in healthy aging are not due to inherent amygdala impairments but to 
strategic processes based on PFC or ACC recruitment [48]. On the other hand, research on Alzheimer’s disease 
shows that disease-related amygdala decline leads to hyperactive amygdala responses to neutral and fearful hu-
man faces [48]. In the same vein, research examining how strategic abilities and goal structure may interact to 
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affect success at emotion regulation, shows that, although the emotion-focused goals of older adults may be 
chronically and automatically activated—operating as a default at an unconscious level, when cognitive control 
resources are not available to guide behavior in a goal-consistent manner, emotional goals may have unintended 
consequences. In such a context, no control processes may be available to suppress goal-inconsistent informa-
tion, one it has been detected. In this vein, the “positivity effect” related to emotional goals of older adults can 
be reversed to an over-determined “negativity bias” [17] [37] [49]. Based on the findings of this study, it seems 
that cognitively healthy older adults display a relatively clear “positivity effect” in the case of basic emotions 
decoding from dynamic visual cues, which is reflected in their excellent ability to recognize happiness together 
with their lower ability to recognize the negatively valenced emotions, compared to the demented older adults. 
Inversely, the results of this study suggest that demented persons, due to their diminished cognitive control re-
sources, appear to reverse the “positivity effect” to an automatic “negativity bias” in basic emotions decoding 
from dynamic visual cues. This is mainly reflected in their significantly lower ability to recognize happiness and 
their higher ability to decode negatively valenced emotions, compared to healthy older adults. 
As regards the specific type of basic emotion, it is worth noting that, according to the findings of this study, 
happiness recognition is not preserved even in mild dementia. Given that the same ability is very-well-preserved 
in cognitively healthy aging, happiness decoding from dynamic visual cues might be examined as a marker of 
relatively early cognitive decline, since it could reflect the loss of positivity bias in cognitively unhealthy aging. 
Besides happiness, the “picture” of findings regarding the second positively valenced emotion examined in 
this study, that is pleasant surprise, seems to be more complicated. On the one hand, the “positivity effect” dis-
played by cognitively healthy older adults appears not to be so “beneficial”, in order for them to systematically 
recognize pleasant surprise. On the other hand, the “negativity bias” displayed by demented persons seems to be 
somewhat “detrimental”, in order for them to recognize pleasant surprise. Finally, based on overall performance 
of each group, pleasant surprise decoding from dynamic visual displays appears problematic in both cases. Moreo-
ver, given the high rate of the confusion of happiness with pleasant surprise in the case of the demented older adults 
as well as the high rate of the confusion of non-emotional displays with displays of pleasant surprise in healthy 
older adults, it is obvious that pleasant surprise, at least as it is displayed dynamically in the EET, is rather con-
sidered a mixed emotion. As Moraitou et al. [15] mention, unpredictability or unexpectedness is inherent in the 
“nature” of surprise. Thus, even if surprise is pleasant, it seems that inherent uncertainty interacts with the posi-
tive valence of the emotion and this seems to seriously affect recognition and identification of pleasant surprise. 
Besides specific emotions and specific biases related to emotional valence, the Socio-emotional Selectivity 
Theory posits that older adults’ shift in goals is associated with broader systematic biases in cognition that favor 
emotional over non-emotional information, in general [17] [20] [28]. On the same wavelength, a series of em-
pirical studies indicated that, when emotional stimuli are relatively low-arousing, older adults display a broader 
emotion effect compared to younger adults, but with no evidence of emotional preference see [13] [20]. In this 
light, in confirmation of Hypothesis 3, it seems that the high level of difficulty of cognitively healthy older 
adults in discriminating non-emotional displays and their tendency to confuse emotionally neutral cues mainly 
with anxiety and pleasant surprise could be interpreted as a general bias which consists in perceiving emotion at 
least in non-emotional displays that are ambiguous enough. Inversely, both the higher performance of demented 
persons in discriminating non-emotional portrayals and their tendency to confuse neutrality with sadness, as well 
as the positive relationship between their ability to recognize anger and error responses for one of the scenes 
with happiness portrayals, could be indicative of the unavailability of cognitive control processes that can sup-
press motivation-inconsistent information in persons diagnosed with mild to moderate dementia. 
At this point it should be pointed out that there seems to be an inconsistency between the findings of this 
study and some previous findings on emotion recognition in dementia [11] [12] [22] [50]. This may be partially 
explained by the type of the task used in this study to measure emotion recognition ability. The vast majority of 
neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies of emotion recognition have focused on the ability to decode an 
emotion shown in static photographs of facial expressions. However, successful navigation of the social world 
requires decoding multiple modes of emotional information, as this information unfolds dynamically. According 
to previous studies which investigated the neural regions involved when people decode emotions that unfold and 
change dynamically, neither amygdala nor temporal lobe atrophy was associated with impaired performance on 
emotion recognition. However, frontal lobe regions such as the orbitofrontal cortex and the gyrus rectus were 
found to be involved in dynamic emotion recognition [51]. At a broader level, strategic emotion regulation asso-
ciated with motivational shifts in older age has been empirically associated with dorsomedial, dorsolateral, and 
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ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex, that is, with areas that support cognitive control 
processes in general [52]. Moreover, at the behavioral level, it has been found that as intensity of an emotion to 
be identified is reduced, the difficulty of both cognitively healthy and demented older adults in emotion recogni-
tion is increased [2] [22]. The EET is designed to examine a person’s ability to decode basic emotions from dy-
namic displays of genuine emotions that are fleeting and evolving [46] [47]. Hence, the differences between the 
findings of this study and previous ones may be partially explained by the different brain regions that are re-
cruited to decode dynamic and subtle emotions, compared to those activated to recognize static and intense 
emotions. Indeed, there is at least one previous study in which it was found that individuals with Alzheimer’s 
disease did not differ from age-matched controls on the EET while they significantly differ from them on a test 
of emotion decoding from still images [22], see also [53]. 
5. Limitations and Future Directions 
Our research findings must be interpreted with several limitations in mind: 1) our sub-sample of demented par-
ticipants including a diverse set of dementia types and the diagnosis was mainly based on neurological and psy-
chiatric examinations. Accordingly, this approach lacks power to reveal the pattern of differences in emotion 
decoding from dynamic visual displays between persons diagnosed with a specific type of dementia and healthy 
controls, or among older persons diagnosed with different types of dementia; 2) the restricted nature of the sam-
ple should be also noted with regard to the number of participants in each group; 3) an additional limitation is 
the cross-sectional design of the study; it is unknown if the same pattern of results would be obtained if the same 
persons were repeatedly measured; for example, longitudinal follow-up of performance during the course of a 
specific type of dementia would improve understanding of emotion recognition in cognitively unhealthy older 
population; 4) finally, demented participants were all staying within the places of hospitality. Due to this stay, 
they may experience more negative emotions than healthy individuals do. So, they may also identify more easily 
negative than positive emotions, compared to healthy individuals. Results from this study would be also streng-
thened by exploring systematically the cognitive and perceptual components of emotion recognition in cogni-
tively healthy and unhealthy older adults, through the use of a comprehensive neuropsychological battery, 
through manipulations in order to change the cognitive or perceptual load of emotion recognition tasks as well 
as by examining multiple varieties of emotion tracking. Generally speaking, more rigorous methods are needed 
to examine the effects of normal and pathological aging on emotion recognition as well as to depict in more de-
tails the specific impacts and influences of environmental factors on the emotion recognition and decoding abili-
ties of individuals. 
6. Conclusion 
The present findings provide important information about the pattern of differences in dynamic emotion recog-
nition in cognitively healthy and demented older adults. The major conclusion of the study is that cognitively 
healthy older adults, due to motivational shifts related to future time perspective that is perceived as limited, 
display a preference in processing positively valenced information, which is known as the “positivity effect” bi-
as, with regard to basic emotions decoding from dynamic visual cues. This bias is mainly reflected in their ex-
cellent ability to recognize happiness together with their lower ability to recognize basic negatively valenced 
emotions, compared to demented older adults. Inversely, demented persons, probably due to their diminished 
cognitive control resources, appear to reverse the “positivity effect” to an over-determined “negativity bias” in 
basic emotions’ decoding from dynamic visual cues. This is primarily reflected in their significantly lower abil-
ity to recognize happiness and their higher ability to decode three negatively valenced emotions, namely, anger, 
sadness, and anxiety, compared to cognitively healthy older adults. 
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